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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this chapter is to explain why Locke thinks religious belief requires 
evidence and, on his view, what evidence there is for religious belief. I will 
explain and defend Locke’s view that revelation can provide evidence for 
religious beliefs so long as there is evidence that God revealed it. Further, I will 
show how he takes the historical evidence of the miracles of Jesus as justification 
for belief in Christianity. 
 
 
 Locke insists, perhaps more so than anyone else, that religious belief requires evidence. 
Although this view is not unique to Locke, his articulation of this point has been especially 
influential and has even been called ‘the single most important source’ of this view (Plantinga 
2000: p. 72). Yet some contemporary religious epistemologists have singled out Locke for 
criticism precisely for insisting that religious belief requires evidence (e.g., Wolterstorff 1996; 
Plantinga 2000). It will be worthwhile, then, to reconsider why Locke thinks religious belief 
requires evidence and, on his view, what evidence there is for religious belief.  
 There are two kinds of evidence that Locke appeals to in support of religious belief: 
natural theology and revelation. Natural theology is the attempt to use reason and observation 
(independent of any revelation) to justify religious beliefs. Locke thinks that natural theology can 
prove the existence of God (4.10) and determine God’s commands (2.28.8). I will take these 
points for granted. Instead, the focus here will be on Locke’s justification for belief in revealed 
religion. On Locke’s view, it is revelation that provides evidence for most religious belief, 
though, as I will explain, he does appeal to natural theology in support of revelation.  
 The evidence for religious belief also comes in degrees. If the evidence entails the truth 
of a belief, then Locke will consider it certain ‘knowledge.’ For Locke, though, belief in revealed 
religion always falls short of certainty. In such a case, Locke insists that ‘the mind, if it will 
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proceed rationally’ ought to base belief on the ‘grounds of Probability’ (4.15.5, my emphasis). 
So, as the second degree of evidence, if the evidence makes it likely a belief is true, it is a 
‘rational’ belief. Finally, it is not rational to believe something without supporting evidence. 
While the latter point seems to be obviously true in most cases, some have thought that faith or 
religious belief is a notable exception. Locke, however, insists that ‘our Assent’ to the tenets of 
revealed religion ‘can be rationally no higher than the Evidence of its being a Revelation.’ Thus, 
while faith is often used ‘in contradistinction to Reason,’ Locke takes faith to be ‘nothing else 
but an Assent founded on the highest Reason’ (4.16.14).  
 Locke goes so far as to claim that we have a divinely imposed obligation to form beliefs 
based on evidence. He insists that it ‘is our Duty’ to accept religious claims as true only ‘upon 
good Reason’ and asserts, ‘He that believes, without having any Reason for believing…neither 
seeks Truth as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker’ (4.17.24, my emphasis). 
God commands us to form beliefs based on evidence! Further, since we can know God’s 
commands, he apparently thinks we can be aware of this obligation. What evidence, then, does 
Locke think there is for religious belief?  
 In this chapter, I will explain and defend Locke’s view that revelation can provide 
evidence for religious beliefs so long as there is evidence that God revealed it. Further, I will 
show how he takes the historical evidence of the miracles of Jesus as justification for belief in 
Christianity.  
 
REVELATION AS EVIDENCE 
 Locke holds that divine revelation can provide evidence for religious belief, but only if 
we first have evidence that God revealed it.  
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 The kinds of evidence Locke considers include reason, empirical observation, and 
testimony. Both a priori reasoning and direct empirical observation provide certainty, whereas 
reasoning (based on past experience) about an unobserved case provides probabilistic evidence 
(see Marušić and Priselac in this volume). I will call this ‘direct evidence’ in order to contrast it 
with testimony (see 4.19.10). Suppose, for example, that, while on the phone, Sophia tells Daniel 
that ‘the cat is on the mat.’ Daniel, who is not present and thus cannot see the cat or the mat, has 
no direct evidence about whether the cat really is on the mat. Yet, assuming Daniel has evidence 
that the testimony of Sophia is reliable, then it is most likely true, given Daniel’s evidence (i.e., 
Sophia’s testimony), that the cat is on the mat. So, Sophia’s testimony indirectly provides Daniel 
with evidence that the cat is on the mat. Revelation, as God’s testimony, can likewise provide 
evidence in the same kind of way. But revelation is even better evidence than human testimony 
because, as Locke puts it, God ‘cannot deceive, nor be deceived’ (4.16.14).  
 Enthusiasm, as Locke presents it, is a religious practice in which people claim to receive 
direct communication from God. (Locke seems to be targeting the Quakers; see Pasnau and 
Boespflug in this volume). The Enthusiasts point to a subjective feature of their experience as 
evidence that it comes from God: the revelation, they say, comes as a ‘Light from Heaven’ that 
‘carries its own’ evidence (4.19.8). To the Enthusiasts, (i) it feels as though God is causing their 
revelatory experience and (ii) the revelation seems to them to be true. In Locke’s estimation, 
however, neither of these subjective features provide evidence for the revelation: ‘all the Light 
they speak of is but a strong, though ungrounded perswasion’ and ‘our Perswasions are no 
Evidence at all of their’ truth (4.19.11, my emphasis). Thus, Locke (wrongly, in my view) holds 
that the subjective features of the Enthusiasts’ revelatory experiences do not provide evidence 
that they have actually received revelation.  
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 Without evidence for revelation, revelation cannot be evidence for religious belief. 
Modifying a case presented by Lawrence BonJour (1980), we can imagine Norman the 
Enthusiast who receives a revelation but has no evidence of this:  
Suppose Norman believes that God has revealed that p to him and for this reason 
Norman comes to believe that p is true. Further, suppose God really did reveal 
that p to Norman. However, Norman has no evidence whatever that he received a 
genuine revelation from God or (absent the claim to revelation) that p is true.  
 
While Norman takes his claim to revelation as evidence that p, Locke objects that ‘Enthusiasm 
fails of the evidence it pretends to’ (4.19.11). He argues: 
The question then here is, How do I know that GOD is the Revealer of this to me; 
that this Impression is made upon my Mind by his holy Spirit, and that therefore I 
ought to obey [or believe] it? If I know not this…it is groundless; whatever Light 
I pretend to, it is but Enthusiasm. (4.19.10, my emphasis) 
 
Without any evidence that God revealed that p, Norman’s belief that p would be ‘groundless’ 
and, as Locke goes on to say, Norman’s conviction that he received a revelation is ‘mere 
Presumption’ (4.19.10). Since this supposed revelation is his only reason for believing that p, he 
likewise lacks evidence for his belief that p. From the point of view of his own reasons for 
believing p, it would just be a stroke of luck if p happened to be true. Intuitively, then, Norman’s 
belief that p seems irrational when assessed from his own point of view (BonJour 1980). This 
suggests that Norman’s belief is unjustified and he ought not believe that p. The point here is 
that, even if God did in fact reveal that p to Norman, his believing that p would be rationally 
unjustified without evidence that God revealed that p.  
 Norman’s situation would change entirely if he had (adequate) evidence that God 
revealed to him that p. For, since God’s revealing that p entails p is true (4.18.10), if he had 
evidence that God revealed that p this would thereby provide evidence that p. Further, ‘there is 
need of no other Proof’ than the evidence that God revealed it (4.19.11). Even if Norman lacked 
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any direct evidence that p is true, evidence that God revealed that p nonetheless provides 
evidence from testimony that p is true. In that case, it would be rational for him to believe that p.  
 The more interesting kind of case is when we have evidence that God revealed that p but 
this conflicts with our direct evidence. For instance, if we know with certainty that p is false then 
we should never believe that p, notwithstanding any evidence that God supposedly revealed that 
p: ‘For Faith can never convince us of any Thing, that contradicts our Knowledge. Because 
though Faith be founded on the Testimony of GOD…yet we cannot have an assurance of the 
Truth of its being a divine Revelation, greater than our own knowledge’ (4.18.5). Here Locke 
implies that we can never be certain that God revealed that p; we can, at best, have evidence that 
makes this likely to be true. Further, the certainty that p is false would outweigh any probabilistic 
evidence that God supposedly revealed that p. Thus, given our evidence, we should reject any 
supposed revelation when we know with certainty that the proposition is false.  
 Next, consider a case in which there is probabilistic evidence that God revealed that p but 
this conflicts with probabilistic evidence that p is false:  
Suppose Isabella has reasonably good evidence that God revealed that ‘there will 
be a resurrection at the last day’ and thus she has some (indirect) evidence to 
believe this is true. However, she recognizes that this is unlikely to be true given 
her direct evidence (e.g., her past observations and understanding of science).  
 
What should Isabella believe? According to Locke, she ought to believe whatever is most likely 
to be true given her available evidence (4.15.5). If the direct evidence outweighs the evidence 
that God revealed that there will be a resurrection, then she ought to believe there will not be a 
resurrection. But, and this is the point, if her evidence that God revealed that there will be a 
resurrection outweighs her direct evidence to the contrary, then she ought to believe in the 
resurrection. In this way, revelation can provide a rational basis for believing propositions that 
otherwise would lack evidential support (Wolterstorff 1996: p. 128; cf. Weinberg, forthcoming).  
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 In several passages, Locke asserts that revelation ought to be believed over probabilistic 
evidence to the contrary:  
Revelation…must carry it, against the probable Conjectures of Reason. Because 
the Mind, not being certain of the Truth that it does not evidently know, but only 
yielding to the Probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its Assent to such 
a Testimony, which, it is satisfied, comes from one, who cannot err, and will not 
deceive. (4.18.8, my emphasis) 
 
…in those [matters], concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence, and so is 
perswaded of their Truth, only upon probable Grounds…in such Propositions, I 
say, an evident Revelation ought to determine our Assent even against 
Probability. (4.18.9, my emphasis) 
 
It may be tempting to interpret Locke here as saying that revelation that p ought to be believed 
no matter what the probability is, given the direct evidence, that p is false (Weinberg, 
forthcoming). But elsewhere he insists that religious belief be based on ‘the clearer Evidence, 
and greater Probability’ (4.17.24). So, instead, the point seems to be that if the probability that 
God revealed that p is higher than the probability that p is false, then we should believe that p 
(Wolterstorff 1996: p. 131). Notice that, in the above passages, Locke says we should believe an 
‘evident revelation’ and one we are ‘satisfied’ comes from God. Thus, Locke takes it to be 
already established that God revealed that p, and the question is then whether it ought to be 
believed given the contrary evidence. Since a revelation is guaranteed to be true, Locke asserts 
that, if given our overall evidence we take p to be a revelation, the revelation should be believed 
in the face of (lesser) contrary evidence.  
 There are several significant lessons to be learned from the above discussion about 
Locke’s view of revelation as a kind of evidence:  
1. In order for revelation to provide evidence for religious belief, there must first 
be evidence that it is a revelation. 
 
 7 
2. If we lack direct evidence that p is true, it can nonetheless be rational to 
believe that p on the basis of a revelation (if we have evidence that God 
revealed that p).  
 
3. Even if the direct evidence concerning p conflicts with revelation, it can 
nonetheless be rational to believe the revelation that p (if the evidence God 
revealed that p outweighs the direct evidence that p is false).  
 
While I take this to be a rather plausible position, there are two sources of controversy. First, 
some religious epistemologists, such as Plantinga and Wolterstorff, reject thesis (1). On their 
externalist theory of justification, rational belief does not always require being aware of 
evidence. But even if that were so, these theorists ought to concede theses (2) and (3). Second, 
there is, of course, disagreement about whether we actually have good evidence for any divine 
revelation. I would think the most plausible evidence here would be religious experience, but 
above we saw Locke reject the view that subjective features of our experience can provide good 
evidence for revelation. In the next section, then, I discuss what evidence there is, on Locke’s 
view, for divine revelation.  
 
EVIDENCE FOR REVELATION  
 Locke holds that revelation can provide evidence for religious belief, but only if there is 
evidence that the revelation actually came from God. So, what evidence is there for revelation? 
Locke’s answer: miracles. Locke uses miracles to argue both for the truth of Christianity over 
other revealed religions as well as to argue against deism, which accepts natural theology but 
rejects revealed religion. Although the argument from miracles was not new to Locke (see Craig 
1985 for antecedents), Locke’s insistence on the need for evidence supporting Christianity and 
his appeal to miracles as that evidence gave new importance to the argument from miracles (Orr 
1934; Craig 1985). Locke’s argument from miracles has not aged well, however, mostly because 
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of David Hume’s critique. Below I argue Locke’s defense of belief in miracles is more plausible 
than often supposed, which opens the door for reasonable belief in the argument from miracles.  
 His appeal to miracles is most obvious in The Reasonableness of Christianity and the 
posthumously published A Discourse of Miracles. The former is an apologetic work in which 
Locke repeatedly argues that the miracles of Jesus justify belief in Christianity. He argues, for 
example, that ‘we see the people justified their believing in him, i.e., their believing in him to be 
the Messiah, because of the miracles he did’ (Reasonableness: p. 32, my emphasis). In A 
Discourse of Miracles, Locke sets out to define ‘miracle’ and specify the conditions under which 
the testimony of a miracle should be accepted. There, he goes so far as to claim that miracles are 
‘the only means God is conceived to have to satisfy men, as rational creatures, of the certainty of 
any thing he would reveal, as coming from himself...’ (Discourse of Miracles: p. 262, my 
emphasis). In these passages, and others like them (e.g., Reasonableness, pp. 49, 84-85, 108, 
341; Discourse of Miracles, pp. 259, 261, 264), Locke clearly asserts that miracles provide 
evidence for revelation, and in particular he cites the miracles of Jesus as evidence for the truth 
of Christianity. Further, as we just saw, he claims that miracles are the ONLY acceptable 
evidence for revelation.  
 A similar theme shows up in the Essay. He claims, ‘Miracles… well attested, do not only 
find Credit themselves; but give it also to other Truths, which need such Confirmation’ (4.16.13). 
Even the ancient prophets ‘who had Revelations from GOD’ did not rely solely on ‘that internal 
Light,’ but instead ‘had outward Signs to convince them of the Author of those Revelations;’ 
they likewise justified to others their claims to revelation ‘by visible Signs’ (4.19.15, my 
emphasis). In order to avoid the perils of Enthusiasm, which appealed only to private religious 
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experiences as evidence of revelation and which lead to ‘extravagant Errors’ (4.19.11), Locke is 
driven to miracles as a kind of publicly available evidence. 
 In retrospect, one obvious objection to Locke’s approach is that it is not rational to 
believe in the testimony of miracles, and so belief in miracles is an implausible basis for 
believing in revealed religion. Deists and, later, Hume saw Locke’s reliance on the argument 
from miracles and then attacked the belief in miracles, thereby undermining the argument for 
Christianity (Orr 1934; Craig 1985). Hume, for example, famously objects that the testimony of 
a miracle conflicts with all of our past experience and therefore should be rejected as too 
improbable to be believed.  
 However, while Locke takes observed regularities to be evidence relevant to making 
judgments about the probability of naturally caused events (4.16.6-9), he thinks that an exception 
should be made in the case of miracles:  
Though the common Experience, and the ordinary Course of Things have justly a 
mighty Influence on the Minds of Men, to make them give or refuse Credit to 
anything proposed to their Belief; yet there is one Case, wherein the strangeness 
of the Fact lessens not the Assent to a fair Testimony given of it. For where such 
supernatural Events are suitable to ends aim’d at by Him, who has the Power 
to change the course of Nature, there, under such Circumstances, they may be 
the fitter to procure Belief, by how much the more they are beyond, or contrary to 
ordinary Observation. This is the proper Case of Miracles, which well attested, do 
not only find Credit themselves; but give it also to other Truths, which need 
such Confirmation. (4.16.13, my emphasis) 
 
Locke’s move here is to argue that observed regularities in the ordinary course of nature are not 
relevant to making judgments about whether or not a miracle occurred. For, if God wants to 
perform a miracle under certain conditions then, given that he can do so, it seems likely that he 
would do so in those conditions; what happens in other cases, where God does not want to 
intervene in the normal course of nature, is irrelevant.   
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 Unlike many, I think Locke gets the better of Hume in this exchange. Hume’s argument 
has been tremendously influential, and even believers in miracles tend to grant the thesis that 
past experience makes the occurrence of any miracle unlikely. But, as a general principle of 
induction, observed cases give us good evidence about unobserved cases only if the former and 
the latter are relevantly similar. (For example, polling a sample of Democrats can give us good 
evidence about the views of Democrats in general because the polled Democrats are presumed to 
resemble other Democrats, but such a poll would not give us good evidence about the political 
views of Republicans.) In Locke’s view, naturally caused events are similar to other naturally 
caused events and so our past experience of natural events is good evidence concerning (for us) 
unobserved natural events. But he reasonably denies that naturally caused events are relevantly 
similar to a putative case in which there was divine intervention. So, past observations of natural 
events do not provide good evidence against the testimony of a miracle. (For a further defense of 
this point, see Rockwood 2018.)  
 Further, Locke believes that there are positive reasons to expect miracles under certain 
conditions. Locke thinks he can establish, prior to any appeal to revealed religion, that God exists 
and wants us to form rational beliefs (see the introductory section above). And, as Wolterstorff 
rightly argues, Locke holds that, since God wants us to rationally believe revelation, God would 
never give revelation without also providing evidence that he has done so (Wolterstorff 1996, pp. 
120-121; 4.19.14). But notice further that, as I pointed out above, Locke takes miracles to be the 
one and only kind of acceptable evidence for revelation (again, see Discourse of Miracles: p. 
262). So, if God reveals that p then God will also perform a miracle to confirm that revelation. 
Locke argues, for example, that the religious Enthusiast should put ‘his Light within to the 
Tryal,’ for if it were a genuine revelation God would provide ‘some Marks’ (i.e., miracles) that 
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the truths were revealed by God (4.19.14). This commitment to providing us with evidence is 
why, in 4.16.13, Locke says that it is fitting to believing the testimony of miracles when such 
would confirm a claim to revelation.  
 According to the interpretation I have described above, there are two main considerations 
that contribute to Locke’s acceptance of miracles as evidence for revelation. First, unlike Hume, 
Locke does not take our past observation of natural events as evidence against the testimony of a 
miracle. Second, he thinks we have independent grounds for believing that God is likely to 
perform a miracle in order to confirm revelation. From Locke’s perspective, then, it can be 
reasonable to take miracles as the basis for believing in revealed religion.  
 Locke thinks that the argument from miracles provides especially strong evidential 
support for Christianity, as opposed to other revealed religions. As noted above, God would not 
reveal that p without providing adequate evidence, by the performance of miracles, that p is 
indeed a revelation. Further, when there are competing religious traditions, both of which appeal 
to miracles, ‘the evident marks of a greater power’ is ‘unquestionable evidence’ of the genuine 
revelation. For, Locke argues, God is unwilling to let us be led astray by false evidence of divine 
revelation:  
God can never be thought to suffer that a lie, set up in opposition to a truth 
coming from him, should be backed with a greater power [or evidence] than he 
will show for the confirmation and propagation of a doctrine which he has 
revealed… (Discourse of Miracles: p. 260, my emphasis).  
 
According to Locke, God will always make sure that the greater evidence, by means of greater 
miracles, will substantiate genuine revelation (Dumsday 2008). He then argues that ‘the number, 
variety, and greatness of the miracles’ of Jesus so far exceed that of any other tradition that we 
should believe his claims to revelation (Discourse of Miracles: p. 261). Thus, it is the superiority 
of the miracles of Jesus that provides evidence in favor of Christianity.  
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 Locke also thinks that the argument from miracles has force against deism. This is 
perhaps surprising given that a distinctive feature of deism is its rejection of divine intervention, 
including miracles (Orr 1934: p. 14). It seems, then, that deists would simply reject the premise 
of Locke’s argument for Christianity. Nonetheless, Locke says he ‘chiefly designed’ The 
Reasonableness of Christianity to convince deists to believe in Christianity (Reasonableness: p. 
265). Locke was not alone in employing this strategy. As William Craig documents, the 
argument from miracles was actually developed by Grotius and others in direct response to the 
rise of deism (Craig 1985, pp. 71-82). But why does Locke (among others) think the argument 
from miracles would or should work as an argument against deism? The answer, in short, is that 
Locke believes natural theology establishes a motive for divine intervention by way of revelation 
and miracles.  
 According to Locke, natural reason can prove that an omnipotent God exists who, 
crucially, cares about human affairs. As noted above, he holds that reason can establish both that 
God wants us to act rationally (including acting morally) and to believe rationally. Given these 
assumptions, God would make sure we have sufficient evidence about what our moral duties are. 
However, while Locke is confident that reason alone can demonstrate moral truths (e.g., 3.9.16), 
no one has yet done so (Reasonableness: p. 139-140) and, in any case, such demonstrations 
would not be evident to the masses. So, one motive for divine revelation is that God wants to tell 
us, in such a way accessible to all, what our moral duties are. A second motive is God’s concern 
for our eternal welfare; God wants to tell us what the requirements for salvation are. Locke’s 
natural theology, then, can establish a motive for God to give revelation. This argument should 
have some purchase against the deist position since they agree that God cares about human 
conduct (Orr 1934: p. 15). The main point of disagreement between Locke and the deists is this: 
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the deists insist that natural theology tells us all we need to know, and (while he does not wholly 
disagree) Locke insists that the easiest and most effective way for God to inform us of our moral 
duties is the revelation given through Jesus Christ, backed up by the miracles he performed 
(Reasonableness p. 147; Discourse of Miracles: p. 264). By establishing a divine motive for 
revelation, Locke can then expect that God would occasionally reveal truths about morality and 
salvation. And if there is revelation, then there will be miracles as substantiating evidence of the 
revelation.  
 Matthew Bagger argues that Locke is guilty of ‘evidential circularity’ (Bagger 1997: p. 
242). He argues, ‘Remember that [Locke] founds belief in Christian revelation on miracles…’ 
and yet ‘he permits belief in the anomalous event that constitute the miracle because, when they 
accompany revelation, their strangeness renders them ‘suitable to ends aimed at by Him,’ the 
God of Christian revelation’ (p. 242). But, contrary to Bagger’s claim, there is no circle here. 
(Notice that it is Bagger who adds the clause ‘God of Christian revelation’; that, on my 
interpretation, is a point to be justified by the miracle and not the justification for belief in the 
miracle.) First, Locke takes natural theology to establish that (i) God exists, (ii) God has a motive 
for giving revelation, and (iii) if God reveals that p then he would confirm that revelation with a 
miracle. Given these points, Locke thinks, in general, it would be reasonable to believe a credible 
claim that a miracle occurred in confirmation of a revelation. Second, Locke argues for the truth 
of Christianity within this framework: there is credible testimony that Jesus rose from the dead 
(etc.), and this would, if believed, confirm his claim to revelation. The evidence, then, moves in a 
straight line from natural theology, to believing the testimony of the miracles of Jesus, to 
believing in Christianity. Locke is thus absolved of the charge of circularity.  
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 It may be useful here to, again, briefly summarize and evaluate Locke’s central theses, 
but this time with respect to his view of miracles as evidence for revelation:  
1. Miracles are the one and only acceptable kind of evidence for revelation.  
 
2. It can be rational to accept the testimony of a miracle (if there is independent 
reason to believe that God would perform a miracle in such a case).  
 
3. God would not reveal that p without providing us with evidence that he has 
done so.  
 
Thesis (1) is certainly a mistake. Even if miracles can provide evidence for revelation, in my 
view, religious experience (among perhaps other things) can also provide evidence for 
revelation. This, in turn, weakens Locke’s argument that we should expect God to perform 
miracles as evidence for revelation. Thesis (2), it is needless to say, remains a point of significant 
controversy. Perhaps the most interesting of the above, though, is thesis (3). Locke has unfailing 
confidence that God wants us to form beliefs based on evidence, including with respect to 
religious beliefs. This commitment, I suggest, is the underlying motivation in Locke’s 
evidentialist epistemology.  
 The overarching theme in Locke’s epistemology is the need for evidence, and we have 
seen that, on Locke’s view, God is invested in providing evidence for religious belief. God 
reveals to us certain truths that are important for us to believe and, given God’s infallible 
testimony, we thereby have indirect evidence for these revealed truths. In my estimation, this 
position is quite plausible. Locke is clearly right that if we have good evidence that God revealed 
that p then this would provide us with evidence that p. In this way, revelation could justify 
religious belief. The two points of controversy are, first, whether religious belief requires 
evidence and, second, whether there is such evidence. Locke’s insight, in part, is that these two 
issues go together: if God exists, and religious belief requires evidence, then there is guaranteed 
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to be evidence in support of religious belief. So, on his view, if God revealed that p then he 
would provide us with evidence that he has done so. In that case, as Locke says, faith in revealed 
religion would be ‘nothing else but an Assent founded on the highest Reason’ (4.16.14).*  
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